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 The Financial Reporting Council is charged, through the Audit Inspection Unit, 
with monitoring audit quality. However, ‘audit quality’ is intangible, with no 
agreed defi nition.
 Although the ACCF meeting came to no unequivocal resolution, it was agreed 
that an overiding aspect of audit quality was the quality of the individuals 
conducting the audit, at all levels of the audit team. It related to their 
understanding of the business, their objectivity and scepticism, and their 
ethical stance and the culture of the audit fi rm.
 Assessing audit quality is just as diffi cult as defi ning it. Members of the audit 
committee, as independent non-executives at a remove from the business, 
are less able to do this than are the company’s executives. Thus the audit 
committee needs to rely in part on management in its evaluation of the auditors.
Executive summary
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Introduction
This paper refl ects the discussions of a meeting of the Audit Committee Chair Forum (ACCF) 
held on 20th July 2006 regarding the drivers of audit quality. The meeting was addressed by 
representatives of the Financial Reporting Council (FRC) and its Audit Inspection Unit (AIU). 
The purpose of the meeting was to solicit members’ views on the drivers of audit quality, to 
inform an FRC project and paper in this area.
The discussion related in part to a slide presented by the FRC entitled ‘Drivers of Audit Quality’. 
This is included as Appendix 1 to this report. The questions posed by the FRC (not all of which 
were fully addressed during the wide-ranging discussion) were as follows:
  How do your audit committees evaluate audit effectiveness?
  Which of the drivers do you consider to be the most important?
  What do you consider are the greatest threats to audit quality?
The Financial Reporting Council
The Financial Reporting Council (FRC) is the UK’s independent regulator for corporate reporting 
and governance1. Its aim is to promote confi dence in corporate reporting and governance. Its six 
objectives are:
 high quality corporate reporting 
 high quality auditing 
 high quality actuarial practice 
 high standards of corporate governance 
  the integrity, competence and transparency of the accountancy and 
actuarial professions 
 effectiveness as a unifi ed independent regulator. 
In relation to auditing and fi nancial reporting, the functions exercised by the FRC include 
setting, monitoring and enforcing accounting and auditing standards, and statutory oversight and 
regulation of auditors. Of relevance to this paper, it is the oversight body for the following:
 Accounting Standards Board (ASB)
 Auditing Practices Board (APB)
 Professional Oversight Board (POB)
 Financial Reporting Review Panel (FRRP)
The roles of the Auditing Practices Board and the Professional Oversight Board are particularly 
relevant to this discussion. The Audit Inspection Unit (AIU), which, inter alia, monitors the 
quality of audits for listed companies, is a part of the POB. Terms of reference for these Boards 
are set out at Appendices 2 and 3.
It was in connection with these activities that the FRC was seeking input from members of the 
ACCF regarding audit quality. 
1
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 Narrative in this section is taken largely from http://www.frc.org.uk/about/
The FRC presentation
“Regulators are looking for something against which to judge performance.”
“Mere compliance with the standards does not, and cannot ensure that a high 
quality audit will be performed.” 
The FRC presentation included a background on the development of auditing 
bodies and auditing standards in the UK. Continued changes in regulations (e.g. 
the Company Law Reform Bill, the EU 8th Directive, the Combined Code and the 
introduction of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) to name but a 
few) mean that companies are being pulled in many directions, and that different 
stakeholders have different meanings of ‘audit quality’. Given that it is the role 
of the AIU to monitor and promote improvements in audit quality, determining a 
suitable defi nition is critical.
The FRC also believes that although auditing standards and inspection are an 
important part of the framework by which audit quality is achieved, they are 
insuffi cient by themselves to ensure audit quality.
A slide was presented (Appendix 1) that set out the FRC’s view of the drivers 
of audit quality. This diagram formed the basis for much of the discussion 
that followed.
The aim of the audit
“There’s no legal doubt on what the audit is for. There is Public doubt on what the 
audit is for. And investors’ views differ from management’s.”
In order to evaluate audit effectiveness and audit quality, it is necessary to 
understand the aim of the audit. Interestingly, not all of the ACCF members were 
in agreement as to the aim of the audit, with a discussion taking place about the 
stewardship function of fi nancial statements and whether audit had a role outside 
that. However, audit is a legal requirement. 
It was further agreed that there is an expectations gap, in that the sophisticated 
investor understands audit limitations, but the man in the street probably has 
a higher expectation of what the auditor does. One reason that there is trouble 
defi ning audit quality is that stakeholders of different types have different 
priorities and expectations of the audit.
“The construct is that the auditor is engaged by the people who are paying [i.e. the 
management]; answerable to the non-executives; reporting to the shareholders. It’s 
difficult to explain how you’ve done a good audit!”
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A further issue raised regarding audit effectiveness and quality was the fact 
that, with the introduction of IFRS, fi nancial statements have become over-long 
and over-complicated. As one participant stated, “Only the cognoscenti can 
conceivably get any value from them.” It was suggested that stakeholders can be 
distracted from the fundamentals of the business by these statements.
What is audit effectiveness?
“Assessment of audit effectiveness is a box you tick on the way to reappointment [of 
the auditors].”
The FRC questions addressed both audit effectiveness and audit quality. 
Considerable discussion took place around these topics. It was decided that they 
were not the same, but that there was a considerable overlap between them. 
Because of the interest in the subject, audit effectiveness was put on the agenda 
for a future ACCF meeting.
What is audit quality?
“ You start with the presumption that the auditor is doing a good job, and 
appraise to see if there’s any sign that it isn’t.”
“ The fact that Enron collapsed and Andersens went bust [sic] did more to improve
the quality of audit than anything else.”
As stated earlier, because part of the FRC remit is to monitor audit quality, it is 
fundamental that they have a clear appreciation of how the term is understood. 
Accordingly, they are undertaking a project to understand the drivers of, and the 
potential threats to, audit quality.
The term is used – and misused – in many different ways. To an audit partner, 
audit quality might be about what his/her audit team is doing; to an institutional 
investor it could relate to the quality of fi nancial reporting in general, which is 
much broader. An illustration was used of a paper on ‘true and fair’ that had been 
circulated by one of the major investment houses: although this purported to be a 
discussion on audit quality, it was in fact much broader than that one subject. 
The discussion on audit quality was extensive, but two key themes to emerge 
were the tone and culture of the audit fi rm, and the practices followed during 
the audit.
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Tone at the top
Auditing is a process rather than a product. The audit reports – management 
and statutory – are the tangible output, but they do not really show how the 
audit was done. One fundamental driver of audit quality, agreed by all taking 
part in the discussion, was the need for the people at the top of audit fi rm 
to set an appropriate tone and culture, to ensure that the work was carried 
out conscientiously, ethically, and in line with all appropriate standards and 
guidelines. Employing and training quality people is a pre-requisite, as is setting 
an appropriate reward structure.
As an example of an inappropriate culture, Andersens in the USA was mentioned, 
with its drive towards doubling non-audit revenues from audit clients, and the 
problems that arose from that2. 
In its investigations into audit quality the AIU focuses particularly on the nature 
of communications throughout a fi rm, and how much attention is paid to the 
views of technical partners, etc. They believe that the fi rm culture and the tone at 
the top are fundamental to audit quality.
Auditing practices and practicalities
“The bigger the firm, the better and more sophisticated the people tend to be.”
The nature of the audit market in the UK is that 99% of FTSE 100 audits and 
97% of FTSE 250 audits are carried out by the Big Four audit fi rms3. Many 
commentators, and some of the participants at the meeting, believe that this is an 
insuffi cient number of suppliers. The audit committee chairs noted that to some 
extent this concentration on the Big Four is a branding issue, but it also refl ects 
the international capability of these fi rms, and the fact that it is advantageous 
to have one audit fi rm covering all territories, to avoid the “opportunity for 
mischief”. They did note that such international coverage is a capability of the 
fi rms, rather than an indicator of quality.
Nonetheless, the general view at the meeting was that the quality of staff and 
partners, in general, would be higher at the Big Four fi rms than at others, because 
more talented people would gravitate to those fi rms. This is perceived as being an 
indicator of quality4. 
A question was raised as to how feasible it was, even with a Big Four auditor, to 
have quality audit staff working for each client. This is a resourcing issue. Most 
listed companies have fi nancial reporting periods ending on 31st December and 
31st March; this means that there is a peak time for audit staff, when there will 
be no spare capacity, and this must be balanced with slack periods at other times. 
This being the case, how practical is it to expect top quality people on all of the 
audits in this busy period? 
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For detail, see:  Arthur Andersen’s Fall From Grace Is a Sad Tale of Greed and Miscues, by Brown and Dugan, Wall Street Journal,  7th July 2002.
3
  Source:  AIU 2005/6 Audit Quality Inspections Public Report, dated July 2006.  Downloadable from http://www.frc.org.uk/ 
4
  This does mean that the recruiting practices of the Big Four ﬁ rms become critical in the evaluation of quality.
Assessing audit quality
“ The big word is ‘assurance’. You’re trying to seek assurance that 
what’s presented is a set of data that has integrity.”
The audit committee has to satisfy itself that the numbers and accounts taken as a 
whole are reasonable, and are the outcome of a process that has integrity.
The view of the meeting was that one major reason that audits could lack quality 
would be because the auditors failed to understand the business and its industry. 
Without such knowledge it is impossible to appreciate the business risks, and to 
plan and conduct an effective audit. 
However, understanding the business and industry, whilst necessary, is not 
suffi cient as an indicator of audit quality. It was agreed that the auditor needs 
to maintain an objective approach to the work, and not be ‘captured’ by the 
client. Furthermore, they must have the necessary scepticism to challenge the 
explanations they are given by management. 
One indicator of audit quality lies in reviewing the auditors’ planning process; 
another lies in the questions they ask during the audit. 
Related to this, it was suggested that a specifi c way to consider audit quality 
might be to examine the time budget for the audit, in particular the time allowed 
for senior managers and partners, and to evaluate how the actual outcomes 
related to that budget. However, the committee chairs took the view that such 
information was not available to them; it was more a detailed management issue.
An important consideration, put forward by many at the ACCF meeting, related 
to behavioural matters. Auditing, particularly in the light of IFRS, is about 
making judgement calls, and the audit committee needs to understand what 
judgements have been made. Some of this comes from appraising the entirety of 
what is said – and, perhaps, what is not said – by management and the auditors 
about the fi nancial statements and the auditing process. Having asked the 
questions of the auditors, the committee must assess the ease and clarity of 
their answers.
“Given the standards we are operating with, how thoroughly and rigorously have 
they been applied? What judgements have been made? How transparent have 
these judgements been? That’s the area I have the most doubt over.”
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Can the audit committee truly judge 
audit quality?
“People often don’t realise just how impossible the role of the NED is … it does 
come down to making judgements about what you’re hearing people saying. That’s 
terribly unscientific.”
Corporate governance regulations demand that the members of the audit 
committee are independent non-executive directors (NED). Whilst there are very 
good reasons for this, it does, by defi nition, mean that the audit committee is one 
stage removed from the business. Their very independence means that they do 
not have the knowledge and background that inform judgement, and they will 
not be au fait with the detail of the business. A view consistently expressed in the 
meeting was that this makes it diffi cult for the committee to judge directly the 
quality of the audit.
For example, the view was that it would be diffi cult for the audit committee chair 
or members to assess, without advice and input from the company’s management, 
the drivers in the middle column of the diagram in Appendix 15. 
As a result of this, the committee is very much infl uenced by management’s view 
of the quality of the audit. It is management to whom the detailed audit questions 
are addressed, and who can assess whether the questioners have understood the 
business. The level of audit questioning is an indicator of audit quality, at both 
the senior and junior levels of the audit hierarchy. Again, the committee chairs 
pointed out that they and the audit committees never get to see the more junior 
audit staff, although these individuals are the people who do much of the detailed 
work, and who can affect audit quality. Thus management is far more capable of 
assessing audit quality than is the audit committee: “Management tells you if the 
auditors don’t understand it!”
Of course, using management as a guide to the quality of the audit does, as 
the ACCF meeting acknowledged, have an element of circular logic: in order 
to establish confi dence in information provided by management, the audit 
committee relies on the work of the auditors; and to understand the work of the 
auditors, it relies on management.
“We are always asking for managers’ input. That is not healthy if the primary 
purpose of the audit is to provide a check on management.”
6
5 It was also generally felt that merely meeting the requirements on this slide would not in itself guarantee audit quality
The audit committee members do see the senior audit staff, who make 
presentations and answer questions about the audit. However, a very pertinent 
question was raised as to how this relates to audit quality:
“ Does the audit committee assess the quality of the report to the committee
instead of the work done to support that report?”
“ Are they making judgements about the quality of papers put in front 
of them and the quality of the answers across the table?”
By the above quotes, the chairs meant that they are assessing the quality of the 
audit at one remove, and the quality of papers they see might not actually refl ect 
the quality of audit work done.
One further issue was raised about how the audit committee can assess the 
quality of the audit, and that related to whether or not there were ‘surprises’ 
in the numbers, and changes thereto. Although the ideal was considered to be 
‘no surprises’ it was agreed that one or two were not necessarily a bad thing. 
However, it was pointed out that the signifi cance of this to audit quality depends 
on whether it was the auditors who had unearthed the issues – which would imply 
a quality audit – or whether the management had themselves found the problems.
How does the published audit report
indicate quality?
“Is the audit report a good output in terms of reporting and demonstrating audit 
quality?”
“We judge audit quality against a product which has lost a great deal of contact 
with its original objective and its original value to society.”
The published audit uses a standardised form of wording, which refers to 
directors’ and auditors’ legal responsibilities, states generically what an audit is, 
and confi rms that the fi nancial statements comply with relevant standards and 
laws. The argument put by the FRC representatives was that this output, being 
indistinguishable between different fi rms and different audits, is a poor indicator 
of audit quality.
A further suggestion by the FRC was that because the published output of the 
auditors is standard, there is no incentive for them to ‘raise the bar’.
“Audit firms are like high jumpers: they have to get over the bar. But there’s no 
merit in clearing the bar by three foot instead of one inch … there’s no external 
driver for something that is higher quality.”
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Various points were raised in response to this view. In particular, the chairs 
agreed that one did not judge the quality of the audit by the external audit 
report but by, inter alia, the audit management letters. These are for internal 
consumption, and do give a much more detailed picture of what the auditors 
have been doing, and what they have found. The published audit report is just 
one output of the audit process.
Regulatory issues around audit quality
Two main themes emerged in the discussion on regulatory issues concerning 
audit quality: the work of the AIU, and the EU’s 8th Directive.
AIU reports
As stated earlier, the AIU monitors the quality of audits and audit fi rms. It 
focuses on the largest audits and, in its 2005/6 report, the nine largest audit 
fi rms. Its published report discusses what was done, and its overall fi ndings 
and recommendations, but makes no mention of fi ndings as regards individual 
companies and audit fi rms. Reports to individual audit fi rms remain private.
There was discussion at the meeting to the effect that one way to inform audit 
committees would be for the AIU to publish its detailed conclusions, as this 
would be an indicator of audit quality. It was appreciated that it might not be 
appropriate for such information to be available to the general public, but it 
could help audit committee chairs carry out their own jobs. However, the AIU 
representative stated that this could be damaging to fi rms, as his department’s 
reports currently include matters of opinion, rather than solely matters of fact, 
and fi rms do not have a right to reply. Generally there was no consensus, at the 
meeting that the publication of individual reports would improve audit quality. 
Publishing individual results would inevitably lead to changes in the way that the 
AIU operates.
8th directive
The EU 8th Directive covers statutory audit. The FRC reported that there is an 
important issue on the horizon, as to how auditing standards are going to be 
regulated in Europe. The FRC is devoting a lot of time to trying to ensure that the 
UK’s principles-based approach takes precedence over a more rules-based box-
ticking approach.
The chairs at the meeting agreed that it was important that the principles-
based approach was adopted, and that the UK was not sucked into adopting a 
more prescriptive approach. Furthermore, they noted that compliance with the 
US’s Sarbanes-Oxley Act was a consumer of resources and time, and a further 
thrust from the EU in this direction would be most unhelpful. Additionally, 
one commented on the problems for the auditor of an increasingly regimented 
and litigious environment, and the fact that, anecdotally, many good people are 
leaving the profession or choosing not to join it:
“We can double the regulation, but if we don’t have the top quality people, we’ll get 
the auditors we deserve.”
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Conclusions
The ACCF discussion was lively and wide-ranging, but came to no fi rm conclusions.
Audit quality is diffi cult to defi ne, and diffi cult to assess. A mixture of understanding, objectivity and 
scepticism is needed, together with relevant technical knowledge. These must be situated within an 
audit fi rm that has an open culture and emphasises the ethical responsibilities of the auditor throughout 
all of its processes.
Audits must be of the appropriate quality, and a company’s board has to be able to assess that quality, 
to determine whether it is getting a ‘good’ audit. The view of the meeting was that it is diffi cult 
for non-executives, at a remove from day-to-day interaction with the audit team, to make such an 
assessment. Accordingly, the audit committee is reliant on management to inform its view of audit 
quality, which presents a circular argument, as one of the roles of the auditor is to comment on that 
self-same management.
Questions to ask yourself
 How does my audit committee defi ne audit quality?
 How do we determine whether a quality audit has been conducted?
And, of course, the three questions posed by the FRC:
 How do your audit committees evaluate audit effectiveness?
 Which of the drivers of audit quality do you consider to be the most important?
 What do you consider are the greatest threats to audit quality?
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APPENDIX 1 – Drivers of audit quality
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Inputs Engagement 
performance 
Outputs 
   Culture
?Corporate governance
  of firms
?Leadership?Business Performance ?Engagement
  decision-making
?Ethics?Risk Management
   Human resources
?Skills base?Appropriate training?Performance   
  evaluation
   Good communication 
?Internally?With Management?With Audit committee
   Quality control 
   procedures
?Consultation?Independent review?Monitoring
Adequate Partner 
Involvement 
Rigorous process 
that encourages 
sound judgement 
Quantity & Quality of 
Audit staff 
Informative and 
reliable audit report 
Job satisfaction 
for audit staff 
Well-informed 
management and 
audit committee 
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APPENDIX 2 – Terms of reference of the 
Auditing Practices Board (APB)
Source: http://www.frc.org.uk/apb/about/aims.cfm 
Aims & Objectives 
Aims
The Auditing Practices Board contributes to the achievement of the Financial 
Reporting Council’s fundamental aim of supporting investor, market and public 
confi dence in the fi nancial and governance stewardship of listed and other entities 
by pursuing its own aims of setting high quality standards and guidance:
  for the performance of external audit and other activities undertaken by 
accountants that result in reports or other output that is published, required 
by law or otherwise relied upon in the operation of the fi nancial markets 
(‘assurance services’); and 
  in relation to the independence, objectivity and integrity of external auditors 
and the providers of assurance services. 
Objectives
The Board intends to achieve its aims by
  Establishing Auditing Standards which set out the basic principles and essential 
procedures with which external auditors in the United Kingdom and the 
Republic of Ireland are required to comply; 
  Issuing guidance on the application of Auditing Standards in particular 
circumstances and industries and timely guidance on new and emerging issues; 
  Establishing Standards and related guidance for accountants providing 
assurance services; 
  Establishing Ethical Standards in relation to the independence, objectivity and 
integrity of external auditors and those providing assurance services; 
  Taking an appropriate role in the development of statutes, regulations and 
accounting standards which affect the conduct of auditing and assurance 
services, both domestically and internationally 
  Contributing to efforts to advance public understanding of the roles and 
responsibilities of external auditors and the providers of assurance services 
including the sponsorship of research. 
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APPENDIX 3 – Terms of reference of the 
Professional Oversight Board (POB) and the 
Audit Inspection Unit (AIU)
Professional Oversight Board
http://www.frc.org.uk/poba/ 
The Professional Oversight Board contributes to the achievement of the Financial 
Reporting Council’s own fundamental aim of supporting investor, market and 
public confi dence in the fi nancial and governance stewardship of listed and other 
entities by providing:
  independent oversight of the regulation of the auditing profession by the 
recognised supervisory and qualifying bodies 
  monitoring of the quality of the auditing function in relation to economically 
signifi cant entities 
  independent oversight of the regulation of the accountancy profession by the 
professional accountancy bodies 
  independent oversight of the regulation of the actuarial profession by the 
professional actuarial bodies and promoting high quality actuarial work. 
Audit Inspection Unit
http://www.frc.org.uk/poba/press/pub1137.html 
The AIU is responsible for the monitoring of the audits of all listed entities and 
other entities in whose fi nancial condition there is considered to be a major 
public interest. By monitoring and promoting improvements in audit quality, it 
contributes to the FRC’s overall aim of promoting confi dence in UK corporate 
reporting and governance. The AIU’s monitoring approach is intended to be 
challenging for the fi rms focusing on audit partners’ judgments as well as audit 
processes. 
The fi rst annual report, published in June 2005, covered audit inspections of the 
Big Four fi rms and their audits of companies in the FTSE 100 and 250 indices. 
The second annual report from the AIU covers reviews of audits within their full 
remit and is based on their work on the second year inspections at the Big Four 
and fi rst year inspections at fi ve Other Signifi cant fi rms. …
The AIU’s reports are not intended to be balanced scorecards or rating tools. The 
focus of its work is on those areas where it considers that improvements should 
be made, either to achieve compliance with relevant standards or to enhance audit 
quality. This emphasis may result in comments that appear critical or include 
little mention
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